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ABSTRACT 
A voluntary contribution process for providing public good 
finance in a replicating economic environment was studied, 
Contributions during the first period were on the order of 38 percent 
of the Lindahl optimum but during later periods contributions decayed 
to very low levels. Some perturbations of the process involving the 
announcement of Lindahl prices and the agents' abilities to 
communicate were also studied, 
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I .  INTRODUCT ION 
The problem of pub l ic goods prov i s ion  has  been central to many 
are a s  o f  econom ics .  The trad i t i onal economic mode l s  re st ing on 
a s sump t ions about nonexcludab i l ity and s ingle-pe riod behav ior lead 
d i rectly  to a p redict ion that soc ial dec i s ion proce sses which rely 
upon voluntary individual  payment for the prov i s ion of pub l ic goods 
cannot wort ( see , for example,  Fel dman 1980 ) . According to such 
mode l s  people w i l l not voluntarily pay. Because the prof i t  incent ive 
cannot ope rate na tural ly to induce suppl y  in an ordinary marke t 
se tt ing,  pub l i c  goods serve a s  a c l a s s i c  model of mar ke t  fai lure and 
exist  a s  the founda tion for many mode rn theories of government . 
The central purpose of the experiment s  we conduc ted was  to 
exp l ore the beh avior of group s w i thin a se t of condi tions where we 
expec ted the tradi tional mode l would work w i th rea sonable a c curacy. 
As w i l l  be ou t l ined below,  our expectat ions were conf irmed . The 
experiment s and the procedures we identify thu s prov ide a se t ting 
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within which pub l ic goods are prov ided a t  near zero level s and thus 
cons t i tute a context for the te s t ing of inst i tut ions and theories that  
are proposed a s  solut ions to  the pub l ic goods problem . Some potential  
solu t ions a re exp l ored in this  pape r and the resul t s  are a l so 
reporte d .  I n  addi tion t o  serv ing a s  a background f o r  fur ther 
experiment s our results unamb iguouc.ly demonst rate the existence of the 
under-prov i s ion of pub l ic goods and rel a ted "free riding• phenomenon 
and thereby d i s credi t  the cl aims of those who a s sert a s  a general  
propos i t ion that  the phenomenon does not or cannot e x i s t , Of course ,  
had our resul t s  been the oppo s i te we would  have been able t o  reject a 
popu l a r  model under c i rcumstance s which were del iber a te ly chosen to  
give the mode l a "be s t  chance . "  
Examples o f  pub l ic goods prob lems t aken from na tural set t ings 
are for some schol ars  inadequ a tely documente d .  Johansen,  for example,  
s tate s  " I  do  not  know of  many histor ic a l  records or o ther emp i rical  
evidence which show conv incingly that  the problem of correct  
revelat i on o f  preference s has  any pract ical  s ignificance" (1977 , 
p .  147 ) . Experiment a l  resu l t s  whicl are frequently dec i s ive i n  
different i a t ing among models i n  other are a s  o f  econom i c s  have been 
characterized by re s idua l  amb igu i ties about the app l i c ab i l i ty of the 
pub l ic goods mode l . Typical ly,  group s in experimenta l  pub l ic goods 
env ironment s do not produce the opt imum amount unde r a system of 
volunt a ry contribu t ion, bu t the quant i t ie s  produced a re u sual ly within 
30 to 50 percent of the opt imum, and 60 to 85 percent of the 
indiv idua l s  contribute someth ing . These data are to be compared w i th 
3 
the pub l ic goods •odel predic t ions o f  a zero level of the publ ic good 
prov i s ion wi th no one a t  a l l  pay ing . Schne i de r  and Pommerehne (1981, 
p .  702) conclude " indiv idual s did systematical ly behave a s  free ride r s  
bu t the extent t o  which free r id ing occurred was  not great . "  
Three a spec t s  o f  previous experiment s led u s  to the particu l a r  
experimenta l  p rocedure• we u sed . The f irst i s  tho pos s ible role of 
repe t i t ion and t ime . Eiperiment a l  exp lorations of the publ ic goods 
model have typ ic a l ly involved only a s i ngle pe riod while many s t a t ic 
economic mode l s  ( such a s  those of marke t beh av ior)  are known to be 
accurate only af ter  the ope ration o f  a convergence proce s s  w i thin a 
repea t ing s t a t ionary environment (Plott 1979, Smi th 1979) . Very early 
experi•ent s suggest  that the same phenomenon w i l l  hol d  in the c a se of 
pub l ic goods . The Fouraker and S iege l  ( 1963) duopol ies  and t riopo l ie s  
experiments become relevant if  pr ice quo t a t ions a re interpreted a s  
pub l ic goods . The se exh ib i t  convergence behav ior w i th repe t i t ion of 
periods . S im i l arly, the external ity expe riment s of Plott (1977) can 
be i nterpreted a s  dec i s ion s i tuations involving several publ ic goods .  
The convergence toward compe t i t ive equ i l ibr ium of these marke ts w i th 
externa l ities can be interpreted a s  a marke t te s t  of zero prov i s ion of 
the pub l ic good a s  predicted by the pub l ic goods mode l .  Thu s, one key 
fea ture of ob served behavior seemed to be the rep l ica tion of the 
dec i s ion cond i t ions over t ime . 
The second �ajor a spec t of other expe rimental  de signs  was  a 
type of discretene s s  of publ ic goods which we wi shed to avoid, Jn 
Smi th' s  expe riment s, for example, the Lindahl equ i l ibr ium was  f ive or 
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six  uni t s .  The di scretene s s  of outcome s a s  wel l  a s  the sma l l  numbe rs  
i nvol ved, might induce a type of "al l or  none" opt ion which might 
encourage preference reve l a t ion. Thi rd, several of the pub l ic goods 
experiment s involved proce s se s  o ther than voluntary contribu tions and 
some of the voluntary contr ibu t ions expe riment s invo l ved i terative 
proce s se s  of propo s a l s  prior to giving a dec i s ion. Such i terat ive 
proce s se s  may have the i r  own important features which  help e l iminate 
the pub l ic goods problem and so, g iven our object ive, they we re to be 
avoide d .  Final ly, several of the exi s t ing expe riment s i ncluded, a s  
p a r t  of the instructions, reference s t o  na tural ly occurring s i tuations 
of a sort which m igh t be bothersome i n  l ight of the resul ts . 1
I I .  DESIGN, PARAMETERS, AND PROCESS 
A tot a l  of nine experiments  were conducted . A sUllllary of the 
relevant fea tures of each expe riment i s  conta i ned in Table 1. A s  c a n  
be seen, subjec t s  were rec rui ted primarily from unde rgradua te 
economics c l as se s  a t  Pa sadena C i ty Col lege and the Cal iforni a 
Ins t i tu te of Technology . The s ingle except ion i s  experiment 7 in 
which subjec t s  were recru i ted from an undergradu a te soc iology c l a s s  a t  
Pa sadena City Col lege .  Th i s  w a s  a n  a t tempt to check a hypothe s i s  
advanced by soc iologi s t s  t h a t  " free riding� only occurs  in soc ieties 
popula ted by economi s t s (Marwel l and Ames 1980) . 
The experiment s were conducted in a c l a ss room w i th subject s  
sea ted t o  al low a s  much space a s  pos s ib le be tween them. The 
instruc t ions (Append ix I )  were rea d .  After tak ing the " te s t" and 
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TABLE l 
Nun1ber of Lindahl 
Subjects in 
Payoff Condition Price($) Price($) 
for High for Low Nature of 
Experiment Subject Pool* High Low Quantity Condition Condition Intervention Comment 
C , I , T. 6th period 
1 Undergraduate 5 5 (23,24] .176 .084 on Lindahl (E MI}** 
Economics prices known 
C . I.T. 10th period on 
2 Undergratuate 5 5 (23,24] .176 .084 communication (E • KH)** 
Economics allowed 
P.c.c. 6th period 
3 Undergraduate 5 ( 23. 24] . 176 . 0 84 on Lindahl (E "' MI}** 
Economics price s known 
P.c . c. 7th period on 
4 Undergraduate 5 4 23 . 04 .186 . 0 91 8  communication (E "' HI)** 
Economics allowed 
C , I ,T (E "' WR)** An individ-
5 Undergraduate 5 5 (23,24) . 176 .084 ual violated rules and 
Economics experiment terminated 
C . I . T. (E "' CL)** 
6 Undergraduate 5 5 ( 23. 24] .176 . 0 84 Two subjects were 
Economics very confused 
P.c . c .  8 th period on 
7 Undergraduate 5 5 (23,24) .176 , 0 84 communication (E "' HI)** 
Sociology al lowed 
C , J , T , 
8 Undergraduate 5 5 ( 23. 24) . 176 .084 (E • HI)** 
Economics 
C , I , T. 7th period on (E = WR)** rather 
9 Undergraduate 4 4 2 0 . 6  . 214 .111 slightly incorrect than 10 subjects 
Economics Lindahl prices known caused some problems 
*C , I . T , "' California Institute of Technology 
P . c . c. "' Pasadena City College 
**E = initials of experimenter: MI !fork Isaac; CL Carl Lydick; KM Kenneth HcCue; WR • William Rogerson. 
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answering que st ions , the experimenter then began the experiment which 
l as ted about an hour.  
Subjec t s  were guaranteed a m inimum of $5 .00 for part i c ipating .  
Before the instruc t ions were read, subje c t s  were endowed w i th the 
$5 .00 and t old  that a l l  earnings in the expe riment would be paid  in 
addi t ion to that ini ti a l  amoun t .  Val ue s for the p ubl ic goods were 
i nduced through the app l ic a t ion of induced value theory ( Sm i th 1976 ,  
Plo t t  1979) .  Each subject was  a s s i gned one o f  the two payof f 
cond i tions in Figure 1 ( which i nd ica te s payof f as a function  of the 
level of p ub l ic goods prov ided in any given period ) . The se 
cond i t ions,  c a l led "high and " low" payoff cond i tions a re approximated 
by the funct ions in the figure, The earnings of a subject in a period 
was  the individua l ' s  payoff a s  de term ined by the level of pub l i c  good 
p r ov ided that period and the individua l ' s  payof f chart m inus the 
amount the individual contributed toward the prov i s i on of the pub l ic 
good that period.  Thus ,  the total  earnings of an individua l  during 
the experiment was the initial  payment guarantee plus  the sum over al l 
pe riods of the earnings for each pe riod.  
As ind i c a ted in Table 1 there were ten subject s  i n  each 
experiment (except experiment s 4 and 9)  hal f of which had the high 
payoff cond i t i on and the other hal f had the l ow payof f cond i t i on. The 
publ ic good w a s  suppl ied a t  a constant marginal cost  of $1 .30.  
Opt imum quan t it ie s  c a n  be found by equa ting the vertica l summation of 
indiv idual valua tions (p ayof f s )  to  the marginal cost . A s  shown in 
Fi gure 2 this y ields any quant i ty in the hal f open interval (23,24) .  
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FIGURE 2 Market Demond and Marginal Cost Curve 
At twenty-four uni t s  the Lindahl contribu t ion i s  $4 .22 ( $ .176 p e r  
uni t )  for those i n  the high payoff cond i t ion and i t  i s  $2 .02 ( $ .084 
per uni t )  for those in the l ow .  For expe riment s 4 end 9 these 
quant i t i e s  are d i fferent a s  shown in Tab l e  1 .  
8 
The dec i s ion proce s s  for the pr imary voluntary contr ibu t ions 
proce ss  proceeds a s  fol low s .  At the beginning of a period each 
subjec t priv a tely wrote on a s l ip of paper the amount ( s ) he wish ed t o  
contribute to the jointly provided pub l ic good t h a t  period .  The paper 
was col lected by the experimente r .  The sum of these contribut ions by 
the subjec t s  was  c alcul a ted by the experimenter and was  divided by the 
(constant ) cost  of the uni t s  to obtain  the l evel  of the projec t 
funded . The level of the project thu s funded w a s  announced and u sed 
to de term ine e ach i nd iv idual  subject's mone ta ry payoff from the payoff  
chart ,  This  payoff de termina tion w a s  made  privately by  each 
indiv idual . The subject s  recorded the payof f amount on a form 
prov ided as a part  of the instruct ions . The earnings for a subj ect 
were calcul a t ed as the d i f ference b e tween the mone tary payoff 
d e te rm ined by the l evel  of the pub l ic good and the contribu tion made 
by the subjec t for the prov i sion of the good , A brief period was  
a l l owed for the compu t a tion of  thi s  prof it before the  next period 
began.  
There were two standard rul e s  regarding the  information of  
partic ipant s :  f irstly,  the  subjec t s  were not al lowed to communica te 
w ith one another du r ing the expe riment. Secondly,  the individua l s  had 
no k nowledge abou t the na ture of any payof f char ts o ther than their  
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own.  Becaus e  of prev ious i nd ica t ions that communica t ion could be an 
important trea tment variab l e  (Dawes  et al . 1977) , th ese  gene ral rul e s  
were al tered e t  certain points  in the expe riment s ( s e e  Tabl e  1) . 
Lindahl opt imal contribu t ions were individu a l ly d i sc l o sed t o  the 
subj ec t s  a f ter  the f ifth, f ifth ,  and s ixth pe riods  in experiment s 1 ,  
3 ,  and 9 respec t ively .2 Experiment '' w a s  conducted w i th eigh t  rather
than the pl anned ten subjec t s  and the expe rimenter reve a led the 
s l ightly incorrect pric e s  which h ad been calcu l ated for ten persons , 
In experiment s 2 ,  4 ,  and 7 ,  conmunica tion was  a l l owed a f ter the ninth, 
s ixth,  and seventh periods  r espec t ively . 3
I I I . RF.SULTS 
The resu l t s  are d i scus sed i n  three subsec tions . The f irst  two 
ref l ect  d i fferent l eve l s  of data  aggrega t ion. The thi rd i s  a n  
analysis  o f  the e f fec t s  of experimenter interventions  to change the 
rul e s  and other parameter ch ange s .  
A .  Publ ic Good Provi s ion 
In our reporting of aggregate d a ta we used only those 
expe rimental  periods for which no change in rules had been made . 
Add i tional ly ,  in expe riments S and 6 ,  event s occurred such that  in our 
opinion they were made noncomparab le w ith the other experiment s in our 
seri e s . 4 A s  such,  in our aggrega te da ta we r eport  only the resul t s  of
the remaining experiment s :  1 through 4 ,  and 7 through 9 .  
The time series  for each expe riment i s  shown i n  Figure 3 and 




.... TArl.E 2: TOTAL UNITS �lJNDEfl, EFFICIENCY, AND VARIANCE 
I OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBlITIONS FOR ALL EXPERIMENTS 
I Lindahl I commun I Linda h lI price I price E1.peri11ent Variable Period known I allowed 
I known 5 6 10 I I 
� I I ILlndahl Prlce1 
I I I I In own Units 7 .6 6 .2 2. 7 1.9 1.01 11.8 4.2 I I I Efficiency(<;,) 52 44 20 15 el 72 31 
I I I· Variance 1907 1461 291 205 '71 5093 796 
I 1. I • I Com11nn l ca ti on 
I Al lowed 
Unit• 2.8 2 .2 1.0 1.2 3,0 1.4 2.2 0.5 1.61 2.4 
4 
2 Eff ic !ency (l'o) 21 17 7 10 23 11 17 4 131 19 
5 6 Variance 307 125 31 139 913 65 416 12 2341 150 
.  I Lindahl Price 1 pj I (nown , 
Units 20.5 6.3 4.0 2.2 0 .91 5 ,6 2.0 0.6 
Er fie leney(I\) 95 45 30 17 71 41 16 5 
!! I �f1�:eudn terminated Variance 17429 1434 727 415 381 2101 405 17 
c I lcon•unlcotlon ::::> I I Allowed Units 2 .1 1.0 0,8 o.5 0.1 0.31 1. 7 2.0 I Efflcleney('ll) 17 8 7 4 6 21 10 12 
I Variance 187 37 27 11 29 31 109 15' 
I te rminated Units 6.5 7 ,6 27,5 22 .5 
Err le lency ('lo) 46 52 Teraln1ted 
Variance 1419 1825 90560 2341 
Unit a 7.9 7 .4 6,0 6.1 5.6 
7 8 9 Efficiency('lo) 54 Teniin•ted 
25 Variance 1384 1289 1183 97� 831 
lco-un lea t Ion 
I Commun I L rndahl I Al lowed 20 I allowed I price Units 12.7 3.4 2 .1 1.0 1.0 1.8 1.BI 1,9 known Efflclency('ll) 76 26 16 8 8 14 HI 15 I r. Variance 10847 431 163 39 41 137 1381 138 15 I I 
I I Units 9,3 10.2 1.3 5 ,3 6 .6 6 .1 5 .5 4.8 6.5 Efficleney('ll) 61 66 51 39 47 43 40 35 46 10 I I Variance 2118 22'7 1147 681 1124 1177 1210 1719 1927 
I .. I I Lindahl Prices 5 I . . I I In own 
I I Units 6,3 3.2 2 .6 2 .4 1.6 0.91 17. 7 16 .o 8.2 .. Efficiency(1"t) u 28 23 22 15 B l 95 92 62 
15 5 10 15 5 10 I! Variance 1308 640 473 323 208 56 I 8338 6959 4139 
Period Average Units 8.8 4 ,6 2.9 2.1 2.1 
Ave•age ECCiciency(") 53 33 22 16 16 
- Lindahl optimum Total Variance 28850 3S86 1087 572 1140 
FIGURE 3 Units Provided by Period 
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period of each experi•ent. The conc lu sions l isted b e l ow s imply make 
prec i se the v i sual  impression that leve l s  of pub l ic good prov i s ion are 
low bu t nonzero and decrease w i th time.  
Conc lu s ion 1. By the f ifth period the Lindahl equ i l ibrium can b e  
rejected in f avor of the pub l ic goods model a s  can any other mod e l  
which predict s  t h a t  the level of publ ic goods prov is ion w i l l  be 
" sub stant i a l ly above" zero . 
By period f ive the average number of uni t s  prov ided in the 
seven experiments i s  2 .1 units  which i s  8 ,8 percent of the twenty-four 
uni t  Lindahl opt i•um .  I n  f ive of the seven l ast periods the prov ision 
level is one uni t  or les s ,  However, the range of the observ a tions a s  
opposed t o  the mean provide s  the e a s iest  way to  give Conc lus ion 1 some 
context . Any model of publ ic goods prov i s ion which has  a med i an 
predic t i on of more than 6 ,6 uni t s  or 27 percent of the L indahl opt imum 
w i l l  be rejected ( a t  the .0078 level of conf idence ) in favor of the 
al terna t ive that the level i s  6,6 uni t s  or below .  Al l observations 
l ie a t  6 ,6 u n i t s  or bel ow so the appropriate s t a t i s t ic is obt a i ned 
( seven of seven) from the binomial d i st r ibut ion. Model s  for which the 
med ian predic t i on i s  more than three uni t s  (12 .S percent of the 
Lindahl opt imum )  wil l be rej ec ted a t  the ,0547 l evel  in f avor of the 
a l te rna tive that the med i an is in the interval [0 , 3] , Thu s  mode l s  
which pred ic t substantial  levels  o f  publ ic good s c a n  be rejec t ed i f  
"sub s tant ial" i s  understood t o  be o n  the order  of 13 percent t o  28 
pe rcent or more of the Lindahl op timun1, 
Conc lus ion 2 .  Fund ing l evel s  are nea r  z ero but s t i l l sign i f icant ly 
above zero.  
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In period S the lowe st  level of publ ic goods prov i s ion 
obs erved was . 7  uni t s .  Al l other observ a tions were above thi s .  Any 
model which pred ic t s  that the med i an ob served level provided i s  less  
than .7  uni t s  will  be rejec ted a t  the .0078 level of  s i gni ficance . 
Th i s  sugg e st s tha t  the error in the publ ic goods  model i s  pos s ib ly a 
variab l e  of intere st  to publ ic f inance , Th e  error ter111 of the model 
which predic t s  z ero cont r ibu t i ons can only be pos i t ive (pe ople cannot 
contr ibu te ne g a tive quanti t ie s )  and so  the error wil l exi s t  any t ime 
any individua l  contribu te s  anything a t  al l, As w i l l be indic a ted 
be low ,  people experiment w i th mak ing contribu t ions p o s s ib ly in hope 
tha t  o thers  w i l l  fol low .  Such "errors" i n  the mode l if  be t te r  
understood m ight themselves sugge st  �ource s of pub l ic revenue s even 
though smal l  in rel ation to the optimum. 
Conc lu s ion 3 .  W i th repl ica t ion the l evel  of pub l ic goods prov is i on 
f al l s ,  
Both the g r aphs i n  Figure 4 and Table 1 demonstrate thi s  
phenomenon, The average quant i ty of the publ ic good prov ided beg in s  
a t  8 ,8 uni t s  and fal l s  to  2 . 1  u n i t s  by period 4, In a l l  expe riments 
40 chang e s  were obs e rved be tween periods w i th no experimenter 
intervent i on and ,  of the se ,  30 were ch ange s downward (equal  
probab i l ity of movement rejec ted a t  ,01) . Rank orde r t e s t s from the 
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FIGURE 4 Individual Behavior in First and Fifth 
Periods in Experiments 1,2,3,4,7,8. 
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period number in a l l  experiments except experiment 2 which began w i th 
a r e l a t ively low level of provi sion and stayed there . 
Conc lu s ion 4. The f irst  three conclus ions hold i f  system effic iency 
is used a s  a measurb of the l evel of publ ic goods prov i s ion in p l ace  
of the  number of uni t s .  
The sys t em should be 100 pe rcent e f f ic ient a t  the Lindahl 
equ i l ibrium and 0 percent effic ient at the pub l ic goods mode l 
equ i l ib r ium of 0 uni t s .  As shown i n  Table 1 a n  a l aost one-to-one 
r e l a tionship exists b e tween units provided and e f f ic iency , Thia  is 
not surprising s i nce there is a funct i onal rel a tionship between units 
prov ided and e f f ic iency ,5 For a ten-pe rson experiment , effic iency
inc rease s ( though in a decreasing fash ion) as a funct ion of uni ts 
prov ided on (0 ,23), is constant on (23 ,24), and dec rea 1e 1  for value • 
grea ter than 24 . 
B .  Ind ividua l  Dec i s ions 
I n  our de sign the s ingle-period dominant strategy for an 
individua l  i s  t o  contribute nothing t o  the provisi on o f  the publ ic 
good . The Lindahl equ i l ib r ium contribu t i ons are $4.22 pe r period and 
$2.10 per period for i ndividu a l s  i n  the high and l ow payoff 
conf igurations  re spec t ively.  Na tural quest ions are rel a ted t o  the 
proportion of the subjec t s  who fol lowed one or the other strategy . 
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Conclus ion 5. Very few individu a l s  contr ibuted nothing the first  
period but  the proport ion of individu a l s  who contributed sma l l  amount s 
increase s  w i th repl ica tion. 
Figure 4 i s  a h ist ogram for indiv idual  contribu t i ons in 
periods one and f ive . Along the horizonta l  axis  is measured the 
period one contr ibu tion. The vertical axi s measures  period 5 
contribu t ions . Thus ,  a point a t  ( 125 ,2 )  indica tes that one 
individual's contribu t ion was  $1 .25 in pe riod 1 and $ .02 in period 5 .  
Not ice that  13 indiv idu a l s  of the 67 individu a l s  i n  the seven ful l 
experiments contributed 0 in period 1 but 25 of the 67 contribu ted 0 
in period 5 and another 7 only contributed $ .0 1 . Only one indiv idual  
who contributed 0 in  period 1 contributed a po s i t ive amount ( $ .01) in 
period 5, 
As i s  evident from the f igure, the contribu t i ons of nearly al l 
subjec t s  reduced between the two per iods . Of the 54 subjec t s  who made 
nonzero contributions in period 1 ,  44 reduced their  payment while only 
7 inc reased the payment , and 4 of these 7 were in expe riment 8. Thi s  
has  the effect of the distribu t ion moving to the right (be l ow the 
l ine ) and "pil ing up" at contributions nea r  zero. The only except i ons 
to the downward movement are the numbers from expe riment 8 ( separately 
marked in the f igure )  in which bo th indiv idual  dec i sions and the 
aggrega te behav ior was somewhat different f rom the others .  
Conclu s ion 6 .  Period 1 dec i s i ons are uncorrel a ted with l ater 
dec i s ions . 
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Table 3 contains the correlation coeff ic ient s of indiv idual  
pe riod-to-period contribu tions . As  can be seen, pe riod one 
contr ibu t ions are sign i f icantly corre l a ted with pe r iod two's but not 
w i th any other period . S imil arly,  pe riod two cont r ibu t i ons are 
corre l a ted ( .70) with period three ' s bu t these are a l so corre l a ted 
w i th al l fol low ing dec i s ions . Period one dec i sions are thus different 
from those of l a ter periods indiv idu a l ly and a1 a group . 
Conc lu s ion 7. Individu a l s in  the high payoff cond ition contribu te 
more than individu a l s  in the l ow payof f cond i t ion. 
Average contribu tions by payoff cond i t ion a re contained  in 
Tab l e  4 .  These quanti t ie s  are a l so shown as a percentage of the 
Lindahl equ i l ibr ium quant i t ies .  A difference in means test s on 
quant i ties (t = 2 .2 ,  3 .0 ,  2 .2 ,  6 .8 ,  and 4 .2 for per iods one ,  two,  
three , four and f ive, re spec t ively) indic a te s  that  individu a l s i n  the 
h igh payoff group tend to contribute more each period . The conc lus ion 
is not true, however, for contribu t ion t aken a s  a percentage of the 
Lindahl opt imum ( t  = . 1 ,  . 5 ,  . 6 ,  . 8 ,  and . 4  for per iods one ,  two ,  
three, four and f ive ,  respec t ively) ,6
The overal l pic ture i s  one of convergence to the one period 
dominant strategy. Neve rthe l e s s  the fol low ing conjecture i s  in orde r :  
Conjecture 1 :  Individu a l  contributions are charac terized by 
occ a s ional attempt s to ge t others to coope rate by unil ateral  inc rease s 
in contribut ion. These a ttempts are important in exp l aining the 
l evel s  of publ ic goods that are produced. 
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TABLE 3 TABLE 4 
INTERPERIOD CORRELATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL EXPENDITURES AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION BY PAYOFF CONDITION: 
IN CENTS AND AS A PERCENT OF LINDAHL F.QUILIBRIUM (IN PARENTHESES) 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 
n = (67) (67) (67) (67) (67) (47) Period 2 3 4 5 
1.00 .32* .22 .18 .06 .15 Low Payoff 83( 40) 47 ( 23) 31(15) 14(7) 16(7) 
1.00 .70** .48** .40** .67** High Payoff 1 53(36) 79(19) 49(12) 42(10) 42(10) 
1.00 .69** .46** .70** 
1.00 .62** .63** 
1.00 .SO** 
LOO 
* Significant to lees than .01 
** Significant to lees than .001 
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The cleare s t  v iew of thi s  idea can be obt ained by study ing 
those individu a l s  who u sed the one-period dominant strategy of no 
cont r ibut ion at least once dur ing periods of no experimenter 
intervent ion, Pre sumably such indiv idua l s  h ave demonstrated an 
u.nde rstanding of the strategic s tructure of the s i tuation. Of these 
36 s ubjec t s  who •ade a zero contribution, lS contributed noth ing once 
they had made a zero contribu t ion, but another 17 made subsequent 
contribut ions of $ .10 or •ore and 8 made subsequent contribut ions of 
$ .SO or more . The overal l importance of such "pul se s" is that they 
appea r  to account for a substant i al portion of al l contributions . In 
a l l  nonteni ina ted experiment s 38 periods exi s t  after remov ing a l l  
f irst periods and a l l  pe riods after experimenter intervention, In 
about half ( 16) of those periods the l arge st contribu t ion was  made by 
an individual  whose cont r ibu tion was  l arger th an that of the previous 
period and 14 of these surpas sed the prev ious contribut ion by $ .SO or 
more (to be compared to an average nondecrease of $ . lS in these 
pe riods) . 
C. Interventions: Change s in Ins t i tutions and Information 
Two different type s of procedural  change s were studied, One 
involved infor• ing subjec t s  about the Lindahl equ i l ibrium, The second 
invol ved a rel axation of the ru les aga inst conversa tion. In addi ti on, 
two f ailures in  experiment a l  control a l l ow us to study some effec ts of 
unanticipa ted events, 
The l oca tion of the Lindahl equ i l ibr ium was disc l o sed on the 
hypothe s i s  that opt imal quanti ties would be more l ikely if indiv idua l s  
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more ful ly understood the potential  advanta ge s  of cooperation, Pr ior 
to the s ixth period in experiment s 1 and 3 and prior to the seventh 
per iod in experiment 9 ,  each indiv idu a l  was given a s l ip of pape r  
which contained that indiv idual's  Lindahl equ i l ibrium contr ibu t ion. 
The group was then told " if each of you were to expend the a•ou.nt of 
money tha t  each saw on the sl ip of paper, then twenty-four u.n i t s  would 
be produced . "  
Conc lu s ion 8 .  Annou.nc ing the Lindahl equ i l ibrium quanti ties and 
price s c ause s  an increase in the amou.nt of the publ ic good suppl ied 
bu t the higher level does not seem to be stable. 
Ini t i a l ly the amou.nt prov ided increase s  dr .. atic a l ly in a l l  
three experiments (from 1 .0 t o  11 .8 i n  expe riment 1 ,  0 .9 t o  S,6 units  
in experiment 3 ,  and 0 .9 to 17 . 7  uni t s  in  experiment 9) , In the three 
experiment s 28 individual s  each made a dec i sion in  each period, In 
the period before the announcement four dec i s ions of the 28 invol ved 
an increa se in cont r ibu t ion ( 11 were decrea se s) and lS increased the 
contr ibut ion af ter the announcement (3 decreased) . The hypothes i s  
tha t  the probabi l ity of an increase i s  the aa•e in  the two periods can 
be rejec ted at the ,005 level ( X2 ( 1) = 9 .6), In all three experiment s 
there is an a l most equal ly dramatic decl ine in the prov ision of the 
publ ic good in periods fol l ow ing the f irst po1tdi1c l o1ure period (from 
11 .8 to 4 .2 uni t s  in experiment 1 ,  5.6 to 2 uni t s  in experi•ent 3 ,  and 
17 .7  to 8 ,2 uni ts after two per iods in expe riment 9 ) . Comparing each 
individu a l' s contribut ion in the period of the announcement w i th that  
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in tho last period of  tho oxporimont we f ind four of the 28 increased 
and twelve docroaso d .  Tho hypothe s i s  of equal probab i l ity of upward 
and downw ard movomont , g iven that movement exi s t s , 7 c an be rejec ted a t  
tho . 0278 level  of s i gn if icance . Thu s we are prov iding evide nce that  
the L indahl equ il ibria  w ill not be stab l e  unde r these procedu re s .  
The second change i n  procedure s  involved the subjec t ' s  ab i l ity 
to co .. un ic a to . In experi•ent s two (pe riod 10) , four (pe riod 7) and 
seven ( period 8) subject s  were told that they were free to discu ss a ny 
aspect of tho exper i•ent or any other subj ec t ,  provided that they did 
not d i scu s s  tho dollar uiounts of individu a l  payoffs,  the dol l a r  
amount s they had contributed in past  periods , o r  anything amounting to  
a sido payment .  Qua l itative de scr iptors ( such a s  a great  de a l ,  much, 
•oro, e tc .) wero allowed . This variable has be en prev ious ly  
investigated by Chuibe rl in (1978) and Dawe s o t  a l .  ( 1977) . 
Conclu s ion 9. Co111111unica tion increase s  the level of contribu t ion ( and 
effic ienc ie s) . The increase i s  small bu t i t  appe ars to be stab l e ,  
The i nc rease occur s  i n  a l l  three experiments ( from 1 .6 t o  2 .4 
uni t s  in expe riment two, from . 3  to 1 .7 units  i n  expe riment four ,  and 
from 1 .8 to 1 .9 uni t s  in experiment seven) bu t rel ative to the L indahl 
quant i ty or rel a tive to the increase s which resul ted from announc i ng 
the Lindahl quant i tie s ,  the increases are smal l .  Of the 29  
individuals , 9 inc reased contribu tions in the pe riod before 
conversa tion ( 7  decreased) and 19 increased contribu t ion a f ter 
conversa tion ( 4  decreased) .  The hypothesis of equa l probab i l ity of 
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upward movement can b e  rejec ted a t  tho . 07 lovol of conf idence 
(X2 (t) = 3 .52) . Interestingly  enough , in expe riment 4 the amount s 
contribu ted do not f al l in the second pe riod a s  they did when the 
Lindahl quanti ties were announced .  In  fRc t ,  the n11B1ber of  uni t s  
provided g o e s  up . Of .the 9 individu a ls who made a second dec i sion 
after ful l  communica tion was  a l lowed, 4 increased and 1 decreased, so 
certa inly statements that the movement upon repl ica tion i s  downward 
r ece ive no suppor t .  
There were two expe riment s i n  our series i n  which event s 
occu rred that may prov ide some insight into several aspec t s  of the 
prob l em of funding a pub l ic good. In experiment 5 one subject in 
e ffect provided by himsel f  twenty-three units of the publ ic good in 
period 3.  Period 3 was the f irst period in which our " altru i st" 
prov ided by himse l f  twenty-throe uni t s  of the public good so period 4 
was the f irst period i n  which the other partic ipants  i n  the oxperi•ent 
could  react to the generosi ty of the prev ious pe riod ( they had no way 
of know ing the cause of thi s  genero s i ty or who was responsible for 
i t) ,  One natural quest ion t o  a sk i n  this instance i s  whether others 
responded to this l arge increase by increa s ing the i r  own contribu t ion. 
The answer i s: 
Conc lus ion 10 . Unil a te ral  al tru ism by one individua l  did  not appear  
to increase the contribu tion of others ,  
Of  the nine remaining partic ipants , two increased and three 
lowered thei r  l evel of contr ibu t ion from pe riod 3 ( rejec t the nul l  
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hypothes i s  that the probabil ity of an i ncrease is .S at the . 07 level 
of 1igni f ic ance) . The conclu s ion must be qual if i ed however because 
the two i ndiv iduals who did i nc rease thei r  contribut ion did so by a 
relatively large magnitude . Both increase s were over $1 .SO which 
exceeds all inc rease s in all experiment s in all pe riods in which no 
experi•enter intervention occu rred . 
The other experiment in which the planned procedures  went 
a 1tray was  experiment 8, In that expe riment (which di ffered f rom the 
others al10, in the fact that it was the only experiment in which a 
moderate level of the public good continued to b e  prov ided through the 
f irst f iv e  periods) , after indiv idual expenditures h ad been collected 
and the total announced to the group for period s ix ,  one indiv idual 
informed the group that his  expenditur e  had not been collected.  His  
expenditure was then  duly collected, added to the total, and the total 
announced .  Since the individual' s  contribution was  zero, the total 
announced was  the same as the prev iously announced total . Two 
subject s of  the remaining 9 reduced the i r  contribution the period 
after the d i sclo1ure,  two inc reased the contribut ion, and the other S 
did not change . Thus: 
Conclu s ion 11 . The di sclosur e  of a zero level of contribution by one 
of the participant •  appears to have had only marginal effect s if any 
at all. 
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IV . CONCLUDING REMARK S  
Voluntary contr ibution systems seem t o  be most effect ive i f  
only a single ( one period) contribution i s  requ i red. Prev iou s  
experiments w ith vary ing type s of proc e s se s  yield public goods levels 
from 35 perc e nt to 70 pe rc e nt of the L indahl opt imum, Similarly, in 
our experiment s  the f i rst period y ielded an average of 38 percent of 
the optimum quantity . We are not convinced that perce nt of opt i•um i s  
the proper measure t o  apply when evaluating the •erit of ide a s .  
Nevertheless ,  i t  i s  the primary tool available now and •ea 1ure 1  in the 
range of those we report have caused s everal authors to expre s s  
sub stant i al optimism about the potent i al for voluntary publ ic f inance: 
"certa i nly the clearest ,  and perhaps th e most important, finding i n  
[the] study i s  the lack of  support for the strong f ree-ride r  
hypoth e si s" (Marwell and Ames  1 97 9 ,  p ,  1349); "there i s  only modest 
evidence for f re e  riding as compared w ith the importance attributed t o  
i t  in the l iterature" ( Schne ider and Po-erehne 1 979, p .  702) . 
Our results sugge st that thi s  opt imism i s  unwarranted for 
c a s e s  in which contributions must be obt ained repeatedly over time .  
Contribut ions qu ickly e rode t o  low levels after two o r  10 period s .  
Furthermore ,  the tendency for the erosion of contributions i s  not 
unique to soc ieti e s  populated by econom i st s  a s  some soc i ologi st s  h ave 
sugge sted (Marwell and Ame s  1979) .  Our single experiment 7 with 
soc iology subject s y i elded substanti ally th e same result• as other 
subject pool s i ncluding econom ist s .  After a few repl ications no model 
of which we are aware i s  more accurate than the s i ngle-pe riod dominant 
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strategy Nash equ i l ibrium, 
We are able to prov ide a few conjectures about po s s ib le 
i•provement s i n  methods for voluntary prov is ion. First,  high 
demander& tend to pay •ore , The propensity t o  pay a s  a percent of the 
Lindahl opt imua i s  about the same across demande rs so a strategy which 
divert s  fund rai s ing effort s  toward high demande rs may make sense , 
Secondly, the announcement effect of a Lindahl equ i l ibrium seems to be 
l arge but unstab le,  while a proce s s  which a l l ow s  individu a l s  to  
co  .. un ic a te ope nly about the proce ss  seems to  stabil ize upward 
contribu tion s .  Thus ,  we conjecture that a combined approach m ight be 
•ore 1acce 1 1ful than e i ther taken a lone ,  The da ta seem to support 




You are about to pa rtic ipa te iu s dec ision proce s s  in which 
one of numerou s  compe ting a l terna tives wil l be chosen.  Th i s  is part 
of a study intended to  prov ide insigh t  into ce rtain fea tures of 
dec1s1on proce s se s .  The instruc t ions are s imple , If you fol low them 
carefu l ly and make good dec i sions, you m ight earn a conside rable 
amount of money.  You w il l  be pa id in cash ,  
Thi s  dec i s ion proce s s  w i l l  proceed a s  a aorie a  of  periods o r  
days dur ing which a project level w i l l b e  de termined and f inanced,  
The " level" c a n  be  a t  zero "un i t s" or more, the ei:ac t level of wh ich 
must be de termined,  Attached to the instructions you w i l l  f ind a 
sheet ,  which de scribe s tho value to you of dec i s ions made dur ing the 
proce s s ,  ca l led the Redempt ion Value Sheet .  You are not  to reyeal 
this informat ion to anyone, I t  i s  your own private i nformation.  
During e ach period a level of the projec t will  be de term ined,  
For the f irst uni t  provided dur ing a period you w i l l receive the 
amount l is ted i n  row 1 of the Redemption Value Sheet,  I f  a second 
unit  i s  a l so provided dur ing the period, you w i l l  rece ive the 
add i t ional amount l isted in row 2 of the Redempt ion Value Sheet .  I f  a 
th ird unit  i s  provided,  you w i l l  rece ive, in addi tion t o  the two 
prev ious amount s ,  the amount l isted in row 3 ,  etc . As you can  see, 
your individu a l  total payment i s  computed a s  a sum of the redempt ion 
value s of  spec i f ic uni t s. (These total s of redempt ion value s  are 
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tabu l ated for your convenience o n  the right-hand s ide o f  the page , )  
The earning s  e ach period, which are yours to keep, are the 
di fference s  b e tween the total  of redempt ion valu e s  of uni t s  of tne 
proj ect prov ided and your individu a l  expend i tures  on the projec t .  
Suppose ,  for exampl e ,  your Redemption Value Shee t  w a s  a s  b e l ow and two 
uni t s  were prov ided ,  
Proj ec t Level 




REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET 
Redemption Value 




Total  Redempt ion 




Your redemption value for the two uni t s  wou ld be 1100 and your 
earnings wou l d  be coaputod by subtrac t ing your indiv idu a l  expenditures 
froa thi s  aaoun t .  If  2.5 units  were prov ided,  the redemption value 
wou l d  be de term ined by the redemption valu e s  of the f irst and second 
unit  plus one hal f of the th ird u n i t ,  that  i s ,  
600 + 500 + ( .5 ) 400 1300. 
The proc e s s  by which the l evel  of the proj ec t  is decided w i l l  
proc e ed a s  fol low s ,  Th e  nWDber o f  uni t s  o f  th e proj ec t  i s  de termined 
by the tota l expenditures made by individu a l s .  Each uni t of the 
proj ect co st s The numbe r  of uni t s  prov ided i s  the total of 
indiv idual expenditures div ided by th e cost  per un i t .  
At  the beginning o f  each period you ere t o  write o n  th e 
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Exp e nditure Form the amount you wil l spend i ndividu a l ly .  Th i s  nWDbe r  
should  a l so be recorded on row 2 o f  your Individual  Record o f  
Earning s .  The se w i l l be col lected and total ed to  obtain  the total 
expenditures ,  which, when divided by the cost per uni t ,  g iv e s  the 
tota l uni t s  prov ided .  Dur ing th i s  proce ss  you are not to  speak to 
anyone or otherw ise a ttempt to  communica t e .  The total w i l l  be 
announced.  The nWDbe r  of units  of the period w i l l  then  b e  computed 
and announced .  
When the  l evel  of the proj ect i s  announced,  you should e nt e r  
the T o t a l  Redemption Value o f  al l units  obt a ined f roa the Redempt ion 
Value Shee t  on row 1 of your Individual Record of  Earning s ,  You 
shou l d  then subtract row 2 from row 1 on thi s  record t o  de termine your 
earning s  for the period, 
Are there any que st ions? 
EXPEND! TIJRE FORM 
Expend i ture for Project.���������� 
30 31 
No. ______ _ 
QUESTION S ( admini s tered after instruc t ions) 
INnIVIOUAL RECORD O F  EARNINGS 
1 ,  True or false, lly earnings per period a re the difference between 
the total of redempt ion value s for the uni t s  of th e project 
de termined  l e s s  the proj ect cost per uni t: 4 6 8 10 
Redemption Value: Total 
for All Units Provided 
2. For the ninth unit of the proj ec t ,  the addi tional redempt ion value 
Individual Expenditure 
for that  spec i f ic unit  i s  -----
Per Period Earnings 
lly total  of redemption value s for all uni t s  for a project of s i ze 3 
units  i a  _____ ; for a project  of size 17 ,S uni t s  i s  
for a projec t o f  s i ze 38 .1 uni t s  i s -----
11 12 I' " 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Redemption Value: Total 
for All Units Provided 
lndlvldual Expenditure 
Per Period Earnings 
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llEDDIPTIOH VALUES APPENDIX 2 :  CONTIUBUl'ION DATA ( in cent s )  
Project Level Redemption Value of Total Red empt ion \'alue Amount Contributed, Al l Ind ividu a l s, Al l experiment s ,  Al l Periods 
!Units) SEeciflc Unit• (cent•) of All Units (cents) 
1 42.9 42.9 Even numbe red i ndividu a l s  are the low payof f cond i tions and the odd 
2 41.8 84. 7 numbered are the high payoff conditions.  
3 40. 7 125.4 
4 39.6 165.0 
5 38.5 203. 5 Experiment 1 
6 37.4 240. 9 
Period 
36.3 277. 2 Subject 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 
8 35. 2 312.4 
9 34.1 346. 5 1 260 0 0 130 0 1422 0 
10 33.0 379. 5 2 0 0 100 0 0 I 0 0 
11 31.9 411.4 3 0 20 20 10 0 1422 0 
12 30.8 442. 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 
s 200 100 80 3S 20 I 10 100 13 29. 7 471. 9 
6 130 260 0 0 66  I Ho 142 
14 28.6 500.5 7 200 200 0 0 0 1300 0 
15 27.5 528.0 8 160 lSS 9S 30 2S I 2s 200 
16 26.4 554. 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 
17 25. 3 579.7 10 40 70 60 40 20 1202 100 
18 24. 2 603.9 
19 23.1 627.0 Experiment 2 
20 22.0 M9.0 1 0 0 0 0 0 so 0 0 0 80 
21 20. 9 669. 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 19. 8 689. 7 3 10 20 20 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S 2S so 
23 18. 7 708.4 4 2S 2S 1S 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
24 17.6 726. 0 s 20 40 0 0 13 1S 0 10 0 43 
25 16.5 742.5 6 130 so 2S 0 12 27 24 22 20 27 
7 0 0 0 0 0 so 0 0 0 10 26 15 . 4 757. 9 
8 100 so 20 1S 10 10 s 10 s 2S 
27 14.3 772. 2 9 4 9  so 30 llS 300 1 200 0 lSO 49  
28 13.2 785.4 10 26 S2 26 0 26 0 26 0 10 0 
29 12.1 797. 5 
30 11. 0 808.5 Experiment 3 
31 9.9 818. 4 
I 32 8.8 827. 2 1 1000 7S S7 13 s 10 12 17 
2 700 150 20 33 2S I 10 lS 6 J3 7.7 834. 9 
3 240 190 140 10 40 I 0 s 3S 
34 6.6 841.5 4 384 4 2 1 1 I 1 1 1 
35 5. 5 847 .0 s 1 1 1 1 0 I 0 0 1 
36 4 .4 851. 4 6 3 3 3 3 1 1202 2 2 
37 3. 3 854. 7 7 200 200 200 200 40 1400 200 10 
38 2.2 856. 9 8 25 1 2 1 0 I 1 1 1 
858.0 9 100 200 100 20 10 1100 20 10 39 J. l 
1 I 1 1 1 10 10 0 1 1 
40 0.0 858. 0 
34 3S 
I I 
I Experiment 4 I Expe riment 7 
I I 
I Per iod I Period 
I Subject 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 I Subject 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 
I I 
I 1 41 31 36 12 10 2 16 26 I 1 760 42 so 10 30 20 20 I 20 
I 2 Left I 2 s s 3 1 1 0 0 I 2S 
I 3 96 2S 27 2S 3S 10 so 60 I 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 
I 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 4 10 12 7 10 s lS 17 I 30 
I s 0 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 s 43 30 20 20 40 40 40 I 20 
I 6 22 1 1 0 0 1 13 6 6 10 13 s 2 8 11 9 I 10 
7 8S 43 21 10 8 10 8S 100 7 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 I 40 
8 3 10 0 13 0 s 13 26 8 22 26 11 s 4 3 2 I 1 
9 20 1S 20 10 40 1 20 20 9 708 12S 43 43 1 0 0 I 0 
10 2 9 0 0 1 12 20 20 10 so 150 100 0 0 100 100 1100 
Experiment s Experiment 8 
1 130 190 150 300 1 100 200 100 100 100 100 200 0 100 
2 18 14 12 10 2 so 60 6S 60 SS so so 40 30 
3 75 7S so 2S 3 200 260 130 100 so 70 20 30 40 
4 100 70 124 100 4 169 104 104 6S S2 78 78 6S 6S 
s 2S 2S 2S 25 s 130 200 200 150 200 250 2SO 400 390 
6 0 0 0 0 Terminated 6 7S lSO 12S 120 100 100 100 7S 25 
7 43 43 43 43 7 50 100 7S 40 lSO 0 10 10 40 
8 130 65 65 6S 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 23 200 111 360 9 300 lSO 50 50 150 150 10 10 150 
10 300 300 3000 2000 10 130 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Experiment 6 Experiment 9 
1 182 130 210 96 130 1 130 0 0 80 0 35 1422 422 0 
2 so so 60 100 0 2 200 0 70 70 100 0 1202 202 202 
3 130 140 200 17S 17S 3 30 120 0 0 0 0 1422 0 0 
4 130 230 150 130 130 4 130 1 0 0 0 0 1202 202 0 
s• 130 0 0 88 96 Termina ted s 0 0 16 16 0 0 f 422 422 422 
6• 140 78 34 50 6S 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 202 0 
7 16S 100 80 100 so 7 200 200 200 14S lOS 64 1423 423 443 
8 2S so 10 100 so 8 130 100 so 0 0 20 1202 202 0 
9 0 130 0 0 0 9 I 
10 75 so 3S 38 30 10 I 
•These two individuals failed to understand the instructions. 
The amounts shown here are as recorded on their own records, 
but these differ from the amounts submitted to the experimenter. 
• 
1 .  
2 .  
F001NOTES 
The substance of thi s  pape r was del ivered a t  the Pub l ic Choice 
Soc ie ty meeting i n  San Franc i sco in the spring of 1980 . 
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In the Schne ider and Poamerehne study, for example,  the subjec t s  
were 1tudent 1 and the publ ic good w a s  the purchase o f  the 
professo r ' s forthcoaing book. 
The procedure for announc ing the L indahl equ i l ibr ium value s  was 
as fol l ow s :  e ach partic ipant was g iven a s l ip o t  pape r  w i th a 
number ( the L indahl contr ibu t i on for that  individu a l )  on i t .  The 
group was told "If each of you were to expend the amount that  
each saw on the s l ip of paper,  then twenty-four uni ts would  be 
produced, "  Unfortuna tely,  it was d i scovered i n  expe riment 1 th at  
a t  least  one subjec t unde r stood the experimenter to be say ing 
that th i s  opt iaal level was  a requi red level of contribu t i on, 
After the misunderstanding i n  expe riment 1 , the expe rimenter in 
other experiment • where the Lindahl prices were disc losed 
emphas ized that i t  was not a requ i rement that they contr ibute the 
L indahl value, 
3 .  
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The subject s  were told before the period began that they were 
free to d i scu s s  any aspec t of the experiment (or any other 
subjec t for tha t  matter) , prov ided that they did not d i scu s s  the 
dol lar amounts  of indiv idual  payoffs or the dol lar amount they 
had contributed i n  past  p� riods . Qual i tative de scr iptors ( such 
as a great dea l , much, e tc . ) were a l lowed . ( It aight be 
interesting t o  note here th at Ch .. be rl in ' •  (1978)  subject s  a l so 
par t ic ip a ted i n  a second dec i s ion i n  which co .. unication was 
a l lowed, but he pl aced no restrict ions on the c onversation, 
except that  the previous level of contribu t ion oou l d  not be 
revea led . )  
4 .  In experiment 6 i t  was  discovered after the experiaent had been 
run that two subjec t s  m isunderstood the instruct ions coapletely,  
leading them to submit  expendi tu res for the publ ic good which 
were enti rely different from the expendi tures they were rec ording 
on their  i ndiv idual forms, Thu s  the experiment as a whole was 
contamina ted.  In experiment 5 a d i f ferent event occurred . In 
the f irst two periods the participants purchased 6 .5 and 7 .6 
uni t s  respec t ively;  th i s  was not out of l ine w i th the resu l t s  
from the other seven experiment s (exc luding expe riaent 6 ) , 
However, in period three, 27 ,5 uni t s  ( g reater than the soc ial 
opt imum) were repor ted  purchased, and 22 ,5 uni t •  were reported 
purch ased in period 4 .  The jump was cau sed exc l u s ively by 
partic ipant number 10 who "contributed" t30 , insuring h imse l f of 
a loss of over $25 , far above the original $5 endowment . A one-
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tiae loss  was not unique per se ( in experiment 7 in the f irst  
period several partic ipant s insured themse lve s  of losses  of ove r  
three dol l ars ) ,  but insuring one se l f  o f  a l o s s  a f t e r  the f irst 
period was unique  to this expe riment . In particu l ar,  when the 
same indiv idual  fol l owed his $25 l o s s  w i th a new contribut i on of 
$20 ( insuring a loss of over $15) , the expe riment was term ina ted. 
The subject in que st ion departed immedi ately w i thout l eaving h i s  
naae o r  contribu ting to  the nec e s sary bookkeeping and owing t h e  
experiaente r  over $40 . For thi s  reason, we have not inc luded 
data fr<>11 experiaent 5 in any of our aggreg a te s ,  though, as  w i th 
experiment 6 ,  the individu a l  da ta w i l l b e  used t o  exp l ic a te some 
a spec t s  of our resu l t s  b elow .  
5 .  The exac t func tional relationship b e tween uni t s  prov ided and 
e ff iciency aay be calcu l a ted as fol l ow s .  Le t x b e  the uni t s  
provided in  a period (x = [c i/130 ,  where c i i s  the contribu t i on 
of individua l  i ) . Then an individu al ' s  ga in, if he has a l inear 
marginal payoff funct i on a i - b ix '  is 
For a ten-person experiment w i th f ive individua l s  h av ing dem·and 
curves of 44 - l .lx and f ive hav ing 27 . 6  - ,8x ,  we have total 
gains equal s  
5 ( 441 - �) + 5 ( 27 .6x - +-) - [c 1 , 
6 .  
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Now, [ c i 130x , so the sUlll of the gains i s  s imply 
228x - 4 .7Sx2 • 
To f ind the effic iency, divide thi s  by the aaximum gain possib l e  
( evalua te the above a t  x = 24) . Now, as  we h ave a " s tepped" 
demand curve , the actual formu l a  w i l l be a l t e red s l ightly to take 
this into account .  Not ice  that  e ffic iency depends only upon the 
number  of uni t s  prov ided .  
Sign i f icance l evel s are : .14 ,  .09 , . 1 4 ,  . 0 1 ,  and .04 . 
7 .  Nine o f  the twe lve for which no movement occurred were 
contribu t ing $ .01 or l e a s .  
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